


## The Small Scale Low Impact Fishery for Bluefin Tuna

### Context

The Bluefin tuna (*Thunnus thynnus*) is the most widely distributed of all the tunas, and is the only large pelagic species that can live permanently in the temperate waters of the Atlantic (ICCAT, 2006-2016). Its migratory routes are complex, but research seems to confirm that there are only two spawning areas in the world: the Gulf of Mexico (Richards et al, 1981, and others) and the Mediterranean Sea (Dicenta, 1975, and others). It is therefore highly important to establish effective fisheries management in the Mediterranean to safeguard the health of this resource worldwide. The existence of these two spawning areas is also the main reason why ICCAT divides tuna populations into two stocks for fishery management purposes: the Western stock and the Eastern stock. The latter includes the Mediterranean and Canary Island fisheries and this is what concerns us in this document. There is some mixing between the stocks, with annual variations, with the line of separation along the meridian 45°W.



**Image 1:** Map showing the distribution of Bluefin tuna (in blue), its principle migration routes (black arrows) and main spawning sites (in yellow). The red line marks the boundary between the two separate stocks managed by ICCAT. (Source: ICCAT 2006-2016).

### Some Background

The fishery for Bluefin tuna is one of the oldest fisheries in the world, practiced for millennia in the Mediterranean Sea basin. During Roman and Phoenician times (2,800 BC to 470 AD) it provided an important basis for trade, leaving its mark in such emblematic places as the ancient Roman city of “Baelo Claudia” in the Province of Cadiz, where the fishery, and the salting and “garum” (fermented fish sauce) industries were the main sources of wealth. Numerous texts describe fishery activities that were practiced with hand lines and beach set nets (ICCAT, 2006-2016). In the XIV century, the latter evolved into the first kinds of almadraba (Ravier y Fromentin, 2001), techniques that continued to be used for centuries, leaving their mark on the territory and in coastal communities.

Despite documented variations in tuna population size due to intrinsic long term natural cycles (Fromentin, 2002), tuna populations were highly abundant up to the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, when “modern” tuna catching methods began to appear. Bluefin tuna catches increased significantly from the 1940s onwards, coinciding with the start of Japanese longlining in all oceans, and the pole and line live bait fishery in the Bay of Biscay. There was also the build-up of the purse seine fleet in Northern Europe dedicated to herring and horse mackerel fishing, which during the summer months changed their nets to enable them to catch tuna. In parallel the sports fishery was also developing.

But this fishing bonanza only lasted a few years, as in 1963 there was a crisis with abrupt declines in catches in the Eastern Atlantic (the straights of Gibraltar and Northern Europe). The Northern European fisheries failed to recover after this, and were declared to be in a state of collapse. The small spawning fish (up to 2 metres long) that were so abundant in the Bay of Biscay between July and August disappeared in 1973, a year which also saw the downfall of the almadrabas and the disappearance of the “National Almadraba Consortium”. This was generally attributed to environmental factors, but recent studies show that these events are related to the expansion of fisheries that targeted juveniles in the Eastern Atlantic in previous years (1949-1962) (Cort, JL & Abaunza, P. 2015). On the positive side, this situation provoked the establishment of the ICCAT in 1966, and in 1974 the first conservation measure (minimum size of 6.4 kgs).

In parallel, during the decade of the 1970s the purse seine fishery developed in the Mediterranean. This became the main fishing method applied to catching Bluefin tuna in this sea area (Cort, 2015). Together with longlining, this technique progressively replaced the traditional fisheries in the Mediterranean and Eastern Atlantic (ICCAT 2006-2016), both maintaining a constant increase up to 1995 when they recorded historic total catch levels of 50,000 tonnes (Cort, 2015). In the 1980s, this model of exploitation caused a second overfishing crisis in the Western Atlantic stock, which brought with it the introduction of the first TACs by ICCAT in 1982 (2,000 to 2,500 tonnes per year). In 1998 Sicilian traditional and almadraba fisheries disappeared.

The situation got even worse in the 1990s with the uncontrolled “eruption” of tuna fattening farms in the Mediterranean (in Spain, Croatia, Italy, Malta, Turkey, etc.) In general, it was hoped that this practice would help to solve the existing overfishing problem, but the impact of the fishery on its feed was significant, as were environmental impacts due to the nature of the fattening operations, including residues, hormones, antibiotics etc. (Sumaila, et al., 2011). What is more, the fact that the eruption of tuna fattening led to an increase in illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing – IUU – (WWF 2006), has led to much criticism of the activity, raising doubts about the way it functions.

Despite the initial agreements and the initial measures taken to resolve the situation, given the complete lack of control, it is estimated that, in reality catches have risen to around twice the recommended levels (ICCAT, 2007).

IUU fishing has been recognized as one of the key problems of Bluefin tuna management. Given this and all the above, in 2006 ICCAT adopted a multi-annual plan for the recuperation of the Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean fisheries, including as the main measures: reduction in



TAC (to 12,900 tonnes in 2011-2012), increase in minimum landing size (from 10 to 30 kgs) and rigorous controls on the landings of this species.

This plan was subsequently strengthened by ICCAT in the following years up to 2014. It has brought about a sea change in the management of the resources and has begun to bear some fruits. Although it may still be too early to announce its definite success, the significant increase in the biomass of Bluefin tuna through this plan enabled ICCAT to increase the TAC for the years 2015-2017, which could reach 23,155 tonnes in 2017.

The dark side of this good news (the recuperation of Bluefin tuna in the Mediterranean) is that those fishing activities that have had, and continue to have, the greatest impact on the resources are those that are being compensated with the lions' share or the entirety of the quotas. In the meantime, small-scale low impact fishers of the Mediterranean, who have engaged in tuna fishing since times immemorial are, with notable exceptions, being excluded from accessing the resource, despite their minimal impact on the resource and the important social and economic benefits they generate for local communities.

Another worrying aspect in the management of this fishery is that quotas are being given to large fishing companies, transforming a public resource into a privately-owned commodity through individual transferable quotas (ITQs). For example, Spanish laws allow the temporary or definitive transfer of tuna quotas between vessels that have access to the tuna fishery. This is leading to the concentration of quotas in the hands of a few companies, and a speculative investment and trade in tuna quotas.

### **Current legal framework in Spain**

The ICCAT recovery plan has been incorporated into EU laws through EU Regulations in 2007, 2009, 2012 y 2014. A new Regulation ((EU) 2016/1627) that replaces all the previous ones has been recently adopted, on the 14 September 2016, and which entered into force in October 2016.

In Spain, measures to regulate the Bluefin tuna fishery have been adopted through orders in 2008, 2013, and 2014.

The ICCAT recovery plan supposedly froze the fleet that fished for tuna from then on, by fishing method, obliging all the contracting parties of ICCAT to present an annual fishing plan for vessels and almadrabas that participate in the fishery, specifying the quotas assigned to each fishing method and the method used to assign and manage them.

In Spain, the latest transposition of the ICCAT recovery plan into Spanish law and currently in force is through Order AAA/642/2013, previously covered by the Order AAA/339/2014, which establishes 5 (+1) independent closed groups authorized to fish actively for Bluefin tuna. These are:

- a) The Cantabrian live bait fleet, North East Cantabrian fishing grounds
- b) Pole and line and hand line fleets of Estrecho
- c) Longline and hand line fleets
- d) Mediterranean purse seine fleet

e) Almadrabas

Without being referred to under a specific heading, but mentioned concretely in a paragraph, “Canary Island pole and line vessels” are cited as recipients of 1.2% of the unreserved quota in the “reserve pool” (Fondo de Maniobra).

These headings make no specific mention of the Mediterranean “artes menores” (passive gear) fleet. Even if some of them could be included under the headings b and c, the headings are quite general and the terms used and their breadth of application are a cause of confusion. In the reserve pool there is a more specific reference to “Mediterranean artisanal vessels” (distinguishing them from those from Estrecho). This pool contains a small percentage (5%) of the total Spanish quota as a reserve, and which must be shared between:

- Canary Island pole and line vessels authorized to target tuna (pesca dirigida)
- Artisanal vessels from Estrecho
- Vessels listed under 6<sup>a</sup> and 7<sup>a</sup>
- Mediterranean artisanal vessels
- Almadrabas

From last year’s reserve pool these vessels received a total of just under 50 tonnes for the entire Mediterranean, with an additional 20 tonnes in Estrecho. Thus, to all intents and purposes, Spanish Mediterranean small scale fishers are excluded from the quota share out.

The artes menores from the Canary Islands face a slightly better situation, as at least they are assigned a quota for targeted Bluefin tuna fishing, as well as having a small amount assigned from the reserve fund. However, the percentage assigned compared to the total is tiny.

### **Current Legal Framework in France**

The overarching international and European legal frameworks applied in France are identical to Spain; both countries are members of the EU and contracting parties to ICCAT. France applies all the rules of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) applicable to Bluefin tuna. At national level, France is responsible for the management of this fishery, notably with competence for:

1. The allocation of national quota amongst the different fleet segments: tuna seiners, off-shore longliners, small scale passive gears (petits métiers), and to the angling or sports fishing sector.
2. The allocation of European fishing permits (AEP in French) to different vessels active in the fishery and the monitoring and control of catch records and trade of Bluefin tuna (uptake of individual and collective quotas).

The procedures used to apply these administrative operations are excessively difficult to understand, based as they are on highly complex legal and regulatory frameworks and on inter-professional negotiations carried out within the following statutory bodies:

- The advisory council for the management of fishery resources;

- the Bluefin tuna and Swordfish committee (CTRE) of the National Marine Fisheries and Aquaculture Committee (CNPMEM) in Paris.

The Fisheries Ministry fixes the conditions for allocating quota every year for the coming season, as well as the methods for allocating annual fishing licenses. The legal basis for this is the Rural and Maritime Fisheries Code (CRPM) which establishes 3 criteria for distribution in French law (articles L921-2 et R921-35 du CRPM):

- Historical catches based on catch records for the reference years (2009 and 2010 for Bluefin tuna - article R921-38.2). These track records do not constitute a right, they are simply used to calculate the quota allocation, through which more than 95% of the quota are allocated.
- The socio-economic balance. Although this is not clearly defined, allocation may be justified according to the whether a professional segment is over or under represented using certain criteria, including: “the fishery activities and gears, the coasts where the fishing vessels are registered, the fishing areas, and the landing centres” (article R921-50 CRPM).

This enables the State to modify the way Bluefin tuna quota is allocated based on socio-economic considerations. Such adjustments are exceptional and its only since 2012 that the “petits métiers” have been included. It has enabled every new entrant to the fishery to be provided with a basic annual quota, without the need for any previous catch history (600 kgs per boat/ year in 2016).

- Non-defined market criteria, that are supposed to “enable improvements in the value added to landings” (R921-49 CRPM).

Bycatch allowance is only provided to trawlers, not to the “petits métiers”. This makes it illegal to keep on board and land Bluefin tuna that has been caught in non-targeted fisheries, as for example by longliners that target swordfish in the French Mediterranean.

Taking environmental criteria into account is a requirement of the new CFP (article 17), but it is not used in France as the main allocation method. They are simply referred to in the French regulation in ways that allow the national quota to be shared out based on historical catches. According to article R921-48.II.1er CRPM, quotas are allocated : *“to producers based on criteria of an environmental, social and economic nature : these criteria may include the environmental impact of fishing, history of compliance, contribution to the local economy and the catch records; the allocation of national quota based on catch history provides an incentive for vessels that use selective gears or which use fishing techniques with a reduced environmental impact, especially low energy use and limited impact on habitats”*. This national quota is topped up when vessels cease their fishing activities (through national plans for fleet withdrawal) and through the sale of vessels with the transfer of catch histories. Finally, this provision remains weak and only represents a small part of the national quota, insufficient to provide concrete benefits to small vessels which must apply for it.

France is alone in issuing fishing licenses (EFAs) on an annual basis, but sets a ceiling on the number issued (101 today for the small-scale fishing in the French Mediterranean, 20 more than in 2012). This ceiling is notified by France to the EU (and ICCAT) and registered in the

European texts governing this fishery. The principle of the ceiling is to adapt fishing capacity to the catch quota to avoid risk of overfishing. This has been the case since 2015 when France justified an increase in the ceiling allowed due to increases in Bluefin tuna quota.

Because of the weighting given to catch history (95%) in fixing the allocation of national quota, only those vessels and associated vessel owners who have fished during the reference period (or who have bought vessels with track records) have access to quotas and thus benefit from the successive increases granted by ICCAT. The petits métiers association SPMLR has been fighting since 2012 to improve this situation, but it remains a minority in the Committee and has not been able to obtain a significant re-balancing of the quota allocated through track records and socio economic criteria. A “50:50” split would provide enormous benefit to the petits métiers who don’t have any catch history, as well as allowing an important opening up of fishing authorizations, without increasing the fishing effort.

Thanks to the efforts of the SPMLR in the CTRE, a small socio-economic quota was created in 2012 allowing new entrants to begin Bluefin tuna fishing activities. However, this quota is hardly sufficient (600 kgs/ vessel) and only concerns around 20 vessels out of 101 French artisanal (petits métiers) vessels in the Mediterranean with an AEF authorisation in 2016.

In reality, the French Bluefin tuna quota allocated to the artisanal fleet benefits a small number of vessels (and ship owners), most of which are owned by industrial Bluefin tuna operators (purse seiner owners and crew) who have invested in the artisanal sector. There are several reasons for this. These are mainly socio-economic (due to the dominance of a few interests and their decisive influence with the French and EU administrations), and legal in nature. The French authorities favour the use of catch history for allocating quota, and as yet, other criteria have not been used.

This unfair situation was the subject of a highly critical analysis in 2015 by the Competition Authority <sup>1</sup>.

Finally, in terms of managing the French quota, each vessel may exploit its quota in different ways:

- Where a member of a producer organization (PO) has been allocated a quota. There are two such in the Mediterranean (Sathoan and South), but they are controlled by industrial vessel (trawler and purse seiner) owners. These (tuna seiners) are the owners of most of the Bluefin tuna quotas, including (the quotas of) the off shore long liners and the petits métiers, due to their large track records. There is an ever-increasing concentration of these, notably due to the bias caused by the successive sales of vessels that allows for the transfer and increase of track records, approved by the administration. The handful of “independent” petits métiers that are members of the Producer Organizations (with socio-economic quotas) have no capacity to influence the decisions of these structures. Their prospects (in terms of quota increases) are dependent on their capacity to invest in the purchase of track records (commodification of the fishery), rather than in a hypothetical modification of the allocation rules.

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<sup>1</sup> Avis n° 15-A-19 du 16 décembre 2015 relatif aux effets sur la concurrence du mécanisme de répartition des quotas de pêche en France. L’Autorité de la concurrence. 2015.  
<http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/pdf/avis/15a19.pdf>

- Members of a group of fishing vessels (article D921-2 CRPM): as recognized by the ministry for a 3-year period non-renewable and responsible for the management of the allocated quota. Today there are 4 such in the Mediterranean (including the Syndicat Professionnel des Pêcheurs Petits Métiers du Languedoc Roussillon (SPMLR)), but they are in the minority, both in number and in catch size (quota).

- Vessels outside the POs, that is to say not part of a PO or a group of vessels. Quota management is collective, open (no individual quotas) and generates a “race to fish”, with little security for professional fishers or for the coherence/ economic performance of their activity.

### **A new reference framework in Spain for allocating fishing possibilities**

In Spain, quota allocation is governed by Law 3/2001, which specifies in Article 25 that the allocation criteria for assigning fishing opportunities to vessels or groups of vessels operating regularly in a fishery should take into account the fishery activity historically practiced by them, its technical characteristics, and the other fishing opportunities they may have. Article 29 of the same law allows for an increase in fishing opportunities in proportion to the existing allocation.

However, following the recent reform of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP Regulation 1380/2013), these criteria are now out of date, given that Article 17 establishes that *“When allocating the fishing opportunities available to them, Member States shall use transparent and objective criteria including those of an environmental, social and economic nature. The criteria to be used may include, inter alia, the impact of fishing on the environment, the history of compliance, the contribution to the local economy and historic catch levels. Within the fishing opportunities allocated to them, Member States shall endeavour to provide incentives to fishing vessels deploying selective fishing gear or using fishing techniques with reduced environmental impact, such as reduced energy consumption or habitat damage.”*

Furthermore, the recent incorporation of the ICCAT Bluefin tuna recovery plan into European law includes specific instructions to Member States to promote coastal fishing activities, and a fair standard of living, as follows: *“The recovery plan takes into account the specificities of the different types of gear and fishing techniques. When implementing the recovery plan, the Union and Member States should endeavour to promote coastal fishing activities and the use of fishing gear and techniques which are selective and have a reduced environmental impact, including gear and techniques used in traditional and artisanal fisheries, thereby contributing to a fair standard of living for local economies”* - Preamble point 4.

It also includes a specific article on the allocation of fishing opportunities (Article 8), which not only incorporates Article 17 of the CFP Basic Regulation, but also calls on Member States *“to distribute the national quotas fairly... giving consideration to traditional and artisanal fisheries, and to provide incentives to Union fishing vessels deploying selective fishing gear or using fishing techniques with reduced environmental impact”*.

However, despite these good intentions to put the Eastern Atlantic Bluefin tuna fishery on a fairer and more sustainable footing, Article 9 of the EU Regulation for a multiannual recovery plan for Blue fin tuna restricts the tonnage and numbers of vessels allowed to fish to those

vessels operating during the period 1 January 2007 to 1 July 2008. Many small scale low impact operations had been curtailed during this period, and are thus effectively excluded from accessing the fishery. LIFE therefore calls on the European and national authorities to right this wrong.

### **Small scale low impact Bluefin tuna fishing in Spain and France**

In the story of the fishery referred to above, taken from several scientific publications and reports, it is possible to see how industrialization of the fishery has brought the tuna stocks to the edge of extinction in only a very few years of fishing; despite these same populations being previously exploited over centuries by a small scale low impact fleet, in a stable and sustainable manner.

As can be seen from the above, **the small scale artisanal polyvalent fleet in the Spanish and French Mediterranean (artes menores, petits métiers)** has participated actively in the Bluefin tuna fishery, seasonally, since ancestral times. This small scale low impact activity, however, has had to survive and adapt to an ever-increasing situation of scarcity of the resource, which has been reflected in the catches and the number of vessels dedicated to the tuna fishery over the years..

**In France**, the artisanal small scale Bluefin sector falls into the “petits métiers” category, and includes three sub categories: longliners, pole and liners, and hand-liners. Today, the quota allocated to artisanal fisheries (petits métiers) represents around 10% of the French quota. 1% of the national quota is also reserved for non-commercial fishing (angling and sports fishing). This is a political choice, a kind of “tradition” but which is not based on any particular legal provisions.

These “petits métiers” comprising coastal small-scale vessels and “madragues” (almadrabas) that are members of the prud’homies (in the French Mediterranean) have officially exploited this fishery for centuries, as a target fishery. The first purse seiners for Bluefin tuna appeared during the 1960’s, and precipitated the industrial development of the fishery.

The banning of drift nets for tuna in 2002 provoked a formal exit from the artisanal fleet (destruction of vessels with public aid) to reduce fishing capacity. This reduction in the number of vessels and their track records led to an even greater volume of catches being taken by the industrial fishery (tuna seiners). Despite this unequal situation in its favour, the tuna industry has overshot its quota significantly. These failings were sanctioned by the EU for three years (2010, 2011, 2012), with a pay-back of 1500 tonnes/ year being imposed on France, deducted from its national quota. This amount has been deducted across the entire French fleet, including the “petits metiers”, although this latter segment was not responsible for these acts of overfishing in question.

**In Spain**, even if the catching of tuna has been carried out traditionally since times immemorial, the activity has only been recorded in Spain by the Cofradias since the 1970s (and earlier in some areas), when a specific licence was not necessary for this fishery.



From 2001 onwards a system of special licences and seasonal permits came into being, whether for targeted fishing or by the opportunistic capture in another fishery (for swordfish, longfin tuna, or frigate tuna on hand lines).

In 2006, following the adoption of the ICCAT Recovery Plan, seasonal permits for surface longlines and handlines were suspended in Spain, leaving all these fishers excluded from access to the resource. For this reason, when in 2008 the capacity of the fleet was frozen, the great majority of this passive gear (“artes menores”) artisanal fleet was not active and remained excluded. A fact that is still maintained throughout the Spanish Mediterranean coast.

Furthermore, in its article 9, the new EU regulation on Bluefin tuna recovery ((EU) 2016/1627) restricts the vessels entitled to fish for Bluefin tuna to those engaged in the fishery from 1 January 2007 to 1 July 2008.

**The polyvalent small scale (artes menores) artisanal fleet in the Canary Islands** suffered the same major difficulties, but thanks to the small scale fishing sector efforts, it has managed to have a somewhat more positive situation than its counterparts in the Spanish Mediterranean.

The Canary island tuna fishery is essentially carried out in an artisanal manner with hand lines. Since the establishment of the tuna recover plan, tuna catches in the Canary Islands have been greatly reduced. This situation has arisen because earlier the Canary island fleets were excluded from the groups allowed to fish for Bluefin tuna in Spain, and were placed in the group that took the fish as bycatch (Delgado de Molina et al. 2014). Although the Canary island catches have declined in recent years, this can’t be considered as fortuitous, as soon as the species appears in the islands it becomes a target species of the fleet that fishes selectively for it. Recently this fleet succeeded in being included in the general allocation, obtaining today 1.2104% of the general quota (as well as 100 tonnes from the reserve pool).

The Bluefin tuna fishing fleet operating with handlines, both in the Canaries and in the Mediterranean, is a small scale low impact fishery, with potentially significant social and economic benefits for the local communities that depend on the fishery. The marked seasonality, high selectivity, low fishing capacity (one man, one hook), and low catch rate (a high-risk fishery given that success is not guaranteed in catching the desired tuna), all contribute to making it potentially highly sustainable. Allowing the “artes menores” fleet seasonal access to fish for tuna will not only help them to diversify their activities (avoiding intensification in other fisheries by allowing them to rest) but also, given the high value of the species, it will compensate for the uncertainty of the fishery and contribute to the fishers’ monthly income. It is a resource that provides a highly prized component of the fishery, and should help the sector to cross the crisis it is facing.

## Conclusions

The Low Impact Fishers of Europe (LIFE) Platform congratulates ICCAT and its contracting parties for their efforts in adopting control and recovery measures for this resource. **LIFE advocates that all these management and control measures, necessary for its recovery, be consolidated so that the long-term sustainability of the Bluefin tuna fishery can be assured.**

LIFE advocates a precautionary approach and for all the necessary management and control measures to be taken to consolidate recovery of Bluefin tuna to assure that the fishery is sustainable over the longer term. The small-scale fishers are ready to work in support of the necessary management and control measures to guarantee that their activities contribute to achieving social, economic and environmental sustainability.

However, LIFE is concerned that that the small scale low impact fleet, rooted in centuries old traditions, is once again being unjustly discriminated against. Up to 2006, along Europe's Mediterranean and Atlantic coasts, a plethora of small scale polyvalent fleets using hand lines used to catch Bluefin tuna, both as a target species and as by catch. In many cases, under the 2006 ICCAT plan, these activities have been restricted or have ceased.

It seems that the benefits from the TAC increase for 2017 will only go to those industrial fishing operations with historic catch records over the period January 1 2007 to July 1 2008. Paradoxically these were the fleets mainly responsible for the overexploitation of the resource. This discriminates unfairly against small scale sector, whose impact on tuna populations is minimal, but who would benefit considerably from being provided with access to the increased quota.

We understand that ICCAT can have the mandate to impose a requirement on the contracting parties to allocate a minimum Bluefin tuna quota for small scale fisheries, both as a target species and as by-catch. LIFE therefore proposes to **request ICCAT to establish such a minimum quota for small scale low impact polyvalent using small longlines and handlines.** Such a measure would be in line with the spirit and letter of the law, as established by Article 8 of the Regulation (EU) 2016/1627 of 14 September 2016 on a multiannual recovery plan for Bluefin tuna in the Eastern Atlantic and the Mediterranean, and with Article 17 of the CFP Basic Regulation (Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013). Article 8 of Regulation 2016/1627 advocates that national quotas be distributed fairly between the different fleet segments, including traditional and artisanal fisheries, and that incentives are provided to vessels deploying selective fishing gear or using fishing techniques with reduced environmental impact, such as reduced energy consumption or habitat damage.

**Small scale low impact fishers reject Individual Transferable Quotas** as a system for assigning fishing rights, whether in the Spanish or French Mediterranean or anywhere else. Fishing is a world heritage; its commodification is neither just or sustainable. We therefore consider that quota should be specifically assigned to small scale low impact fishers and ring fenced to prevent its transfer to other fleet segments.

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